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Abstract
In this study, we discuss a connection between heterogeneity of agents
and indeterminacy of equilibria in a standard money-in-the-utility function
model. Contrary to ealier studies, which mainly concern indeterminacy in
connection with monetary policy or preferences of a single agent, we em-
phasize the role of heterogeneity of agents in indeterminacy.
1 Introduction
It is well known that indeterminacy and chaotic behaviour of equilibria can
arise in a monetary economy. To the best of our knowledge, the first work
analysing the relationship between a monetary economy and the indetermi-
nacy of equilibria is Brock [1974], who shows that there are multiple equi-
librium paths in a discrete-time version of a monetary model with a single
agent and elastic labour supply. Gray [1984] and Obstfeld [1984] show that
indeterminacy of monetary equilibria may arise in a model with a nonsepa-
rable utility function in real money holdings and consumption in continuous-
time frameworks. In addition, Mino [1989] studies indeterminacy in connec-
tion with several endogenized money supply rules. Matsuyama [1991] finds
that chaotic behaviour of equilibria also arises in a discrete-time framework.
Fukuda [1993] demonstrates that these results also hold in a model with
separable utility function. However, all of the above studies mainly concern
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan,
katsuhiko.hori@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp. The author is grateful to Takuma Kunieda, John Stachurski,
Makoto Yano, and all other participants of the conference, some of whom provided him with
helpful comments. Especially, he is grateful to Atsumasa Kondo, Akihisa Shibata, and Kazuo
Nishimura for their generous encouragement and suggestions and to anonymous referee for his
helpful suggestions.
1
indeterminacy and chaotic behaviour of equilibria in connection with the
monetary policy or preferences of a single agent in an economy. In contrast,
this paper focuses on heterogeneity of real asset holdings and its relationship
to indeterminacy of monetary equilibria.
The linkage between indeterminacy and heterogeneity of agents has been
investigated in several recent studies. Using an overlapping-generations
model with heterogeneous agents, Ghiglino and Tvede [1995] show that het-
erogeneity may generate indeterminacy and cycles. Ghiglino and Olszak-
Duquenne [2001] and Ghiglino and Sorger [2002] demonstrate that these
results also hold in the discrete-time version of a two-sector model with
Leontief-type production and in a continuous-time version of a one-sector
model with externalities and elastic labour supply1. In a similar spirit, this
paper investigates indeterminacy of equilibria in connection with wealth dis-
tribution in a standard model of money-in-the-utility function.
2 Model
In the economy, there are J types of household, indexed by j = 1;    ; J.
Each household has additive separable preferences between periods and be-
tween goods and money holdings. The households also have the same posi-
tive discount factor, denoted by . In specific terms, the problem to be solved
is as follows:
max
1X
t=0
t

u j

c jt

+ v j

m jt

j = 1;    ; J
s:t: Pty j + (1 + it) Qta jt + M jt +  jXt = Ptc jt + Qt+1a jt+1 + M jt+1, (1)
where it denotes the nominal interest; Pt, the price of goods; Qt, the price
of the capital asset, and Xt, an aggregate nominal transfer to households
in period t2. Further,  j and y j denote respectively an exogenous income
received by and the share of the nominal transfer to household j, and they are
assumed to be independent of periods. Finally, c jt denotes the consumption
of goods; M jt, money holdings; m jt, real money holdings, that is, m jt =
M jt=Pt; and a jt, the non-produced capital asset, such as land, of household
j in period t. The capital asset is assumed to be initially supplied to each
household at an amount  j ¯k, or a j0 =  j ¯k, where ¯k is the aggregate amount
of capital and  j is the initial share of the endowment of household j. The
1See Ghiglino [2005] and Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne [2005] for other works studying the
linkage between indeterminacy and heterogeneity.
2The exsistence of nominal transfers, or negative inflation taxes, will be the source of indeter-
minacy of equilibria in the model of this paper. In general, the distortion tax, as well as externali-
ties, is known to the one of the sources of indeterminacy.
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capital asset is assumed to yield a fixed outcome of r per unit3. This implies
that the nominal interest rate satisfies (1 + it) Qt = Pt+1r + Qt+1. The left-
hand side of this equation presents the gross nominal revenue obtained by
giving up a unit of the capital asset. The right-hand side of the equation
is the gross nominal revenue of a unit of the capital asset since a unit of
the capital asset in period t yields r units of outcome in period t + 1 and
its price is Qt+1. It follows that the nominal interest rate can be written as
1 + it = (r + qt+1) (1 + t) =qt, where qt — the relative price of capital to
output — Qt=Pt and the inflation rate t equals (Pt+1   Pt) =Pt. Hence, it
follows from (1) that the lifetime budget constraint can be written as
(r + q1) P1 j ¯k +
1X
t=0
tY
s=1
1
1 + is

Pty j + M jt +  jXt

=
1X
t=0
tY
s=1
1
1 + is

Ptc jt + M jt+1

, (2)
where  j denotes the share of household j in the aggregate capital stock.
This implies that
PJ
j=1 n j j = 1, where n j is the number of household j.
Moreover, we assume that
Q0
s=1 1=(1 + is) = 1 for tractability. Therefore,
the Lagrangian of this problem can be written as
L j =
1X
t=0
t

u j

c jt

+ v j

m jt

+ j

(1 + q1) P1 j ¯k
+
1X
t=0
tY
s=1
1
1 + is

Pty j + M jt +  jXt   Ptc jt   M jt+1
37777775 . (3)
The first-order conditions of this problem are as follows:
tu0j

c jt

=  jPt
tY
s=1
1
1 + is
and
tv0j

m jt

=  jit+1Pt
t+1Y
s=1
1
1 + is
.
3The assumptions that the exogenous income and the interest rate are ensured by the assump-
tions that the amounts of labour and the initial endowment of capital are exogenous and they cannot
employ other inputs. Suppose that the aggregate production function takes a Cobb=Douglas form:
y = ¯kl1 , where y and l are the aggregate amounts of output and labour employed, respectively.
In this case, the interest rate, r, and the wage rate, w, are determined independently of periods
since the amounts of capital and labour are fixed over periods: r = ¯k 1l1  and w = (1 )kl ,
respectively. The latter of the two equations also implies the income of household j is constant
through periods: y j = wl j, where l j is the amount of labour supplied by household j.
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Moreover, the market-clearing conditions of this economy are
y + r¯k = ct (4)
and
Mt =
JX
j=1
n jM jt, (5)
where y and ct denote the aggregate amount of income and consumption
in period t, respectively; y = PJj=1 n jy j and ct = PJj=1 n jc jt. The market-
clearing conditions implies Walras’s law that yields
Xt = (   1)Mt, (6)
where Mt denotes the aggregate money supply in period t and  denotes the
gross growth rate of money supply;  = Mt+1=Mt. To be well defined the
problem, we assume that  > . This also implies that
t = mt=mt+1   1. (7)
We then proceed to consider the steady-state equilibria, the following
must hold: cj = c jt, m

j = m jt and q
 = qt for all t. It follows from (7) that
these conditions imply that Pt+1 = Pt, Qt+1 = Qt and 1+i = (r=q + 1) .
Thus, the first-order conditions can be rewritten as
u0j

cj

=  jP0
266666664 1  rq + 1
377777775
t
(8)
and
v0j

mj

=  jP0i
266666664 1  rq + 1
377777775
t+1
. (9)
For these two conditions to be well defined, the equality q = r= (1   )
must hold. Substituting it back into (8) and (9), we have
u0j

cj

=  jP0 (10)
and
v0j

mj

=  jP0
 


  1
!
, (11)
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respectively. Here, these two equations show cj and m

j to be decreasing
functions of the Lagrange multiplier  j. Moreover, it follows from (2) that
the consumption of household j in a steady state can be written as
cj = y j + r j ¯k + (   1)

 jm   mj

, (12)
where
m =
JX
j=1
n jmj . (13)
Moreover, (12) can be rewritten as
cj + (   1)mj = y j + r j ¯k + (   1) jm. (14)
To ensure the uniqueness of the steady state, we assume that the demand
of each household for money holdings is equal to the amount of monetary
transfer; thus, mj =  jm
4
. In this case, (14) is simplified as
cj = y j + r j ¯k. (15)
Combining equations (8), (9) and (15), we have
v0j

mj

u0j

y j + r j ¯k
 = 

  1. (16)
This equation implies that the real money holdings of household j are in-
creasing in its income and capital endowment.
3 Aggregate Behaviour
As shown in Negishi [1960] and in Kehoe, Levine, and Romer [1992], the
aggregate behaviour of the economy can be characterized by the following
problem:
max
1X
t=0
tW (ct;mt;1;    ; J)
s:t: ct = y + r¯k + mt   (1 + t) mt+1 + XtPt ,
4Equations (13) and (14) determine the value of  j, and thus, that of cj and mj from (10) and
(11, respectively. However, these equations imply the possibility of multiple steady states since
both hand sides of (13) are decreasing in  j from (??) and (13). Although the existence of multiple
steady states is an interesting issue, we only address the case of a unique steady state in this paper.
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where, W() is a Negishi function that is defined as follows:
W (ct;mt;1;    ; J) = maxfc jt ;m jtg
JX
j=1
 jn j

u j

c jt

+ v j

m jt

. (17)
Here,  j is the reciprocal of the Lagrange multiplier of household j weighted
by its population,  j = 1=

 jn j

. To characterize the Negishi function, we
define the Lagrangian of this problem as
Lt =
JX
j=1
 jn j

u j

c jt

+ v j

m jt

+ ct
0BBBBBBB@ct   JX
j=1
n jc jt
1CCCCCCCA + mt
0BBBBBBB@mt   JX
j=1
n jm jt
1CCCCCCCA . (18)
The necessary conditions of this problem can be written as
 jn ju0j

cjt

= ct (19)
and
 jn jv0j

mjt

= mt for all j, (20)
where cjt and m

jt denote the optimal consumption and money holdings of
household j, respectively5. Since, from (19) and (20), both c jt and m jt
are monotonically decreasing in ct and mt, respectively, c jt and m jt are
uniquely determined if ct and mt are given. Therefore, we define Negishi
functions for goods and money holdings as uˆ (ct) = PJj=1  jn ju j cjt and
vˆ (mt) = PJj=1  jn jv j mjt, respectively. Using these notations, we can ex-
press the Bellman equation for the intertemporal problem as6
ˆVt (mt) = max uˆ
 
y + r¯k + mt   (1 + t) mt+1 + XtPt
!
+ vˆ (mt) +  ˆVt+1 (mt+1) ,
where ˆVt is the social value function. Therefore, the necessary and envelope
conditions for maximization yields
uˆ0 (ct)    PtPt+1
 
uˆ0 (ct+1) + vˆ0 (mt+1) = 0. (21)
5Note that the first-order conditions (19) and (20) are the same as the above equations of (4)
and (5) if ct =  tPt Qts=1 1= (1 + is) and mt =  tPtit+1 Qt+1s=1 1= (1 + is), which imply that the
solution of the problem in this section represents equilibria of the market economy considered in
Section 2.
6As in Kehoe et al. [1992] and in Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne [2001], we can call the
solution of this problem to be pseudo-Pareto optimum in the sense that it is the solution to the
maximization of a Negishi function under given nominal transfers.
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Using (4), (5), (6) and (7), equation (21) can be rewritten as
mt =


mt+1
0BBBBBB@1 + vˆ0 (mt+1)
uˆ0

y + r¯k
1CCCCCCA . (22)
The above equation describes the aggregate behavior of the real stock of
money. Moreover, in a steady state, since the amount of real money holdings
is constant over periods, (22) can be rewritten as follows:
vˆ0(m)
uˆ0(y + r¯k) =


  1. (23)
This equation determines the aggregate real stock of money in a steady state.
4 Indeterminacy
This section considers a condition for indeterminacy of equilibria. From
(22), we know equilibria are locally indeterminate if the absolute value of
the gradient of the right-hand side of (22) with respect to mt+1 is greater than
1 around the steady state. Therefore, it follows from (23) that this condition
can be written as
ˆ
 
m

<
1
2
 
1   

!
, (24)
where ˆ denotes a social intertemporal elasticity of substitution in money
holdings; that is, ˆ (m) =  vˆ0 (m) = (vˆ00 (m) m). Thus, (24) suggests that
a lower social intertemporal elasticity of substitution tends to generate in-
determinacy. To investigate this condition in greater detail, we calculate the
social intertemporal elasticity of substitution in a manner similar to that of
Ghiglino [2005], that yields
ˆ
 
m

=
JX
j=1
n j j

mj
 mj
m
, (25)
where  j

mj

denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the in-
dividual utility of money holdings:  j

mj

=  v0j

mj

=

mjv
00
j

mj

. This
equation, together with (24), implies that wealth distribution may cause the
indeterminacy of monetary equilibria since (16) suggests that mj depends on
the distribution of income and the initial shares of the capital asset among
agents.
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5 Examples
Here, we present a few examples with specific forms of utility functions. In
the following examples, we assume throughout that there are only two types
of households with the same population 1=2 and income flow y and that their
utility functions with respect to consumption take an identical logarithmic
form: u j

c jt

= ln c jt.
 CIES Utility When v j

m jt

=  j=

 j   1

m
 j=( j 1)
jt , the social in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution can be written as
ˆCIES =
P2
j=1


   1
 j 1 
y + r j ¯k
1  j
 jP2
j=1


   1
 j 1 
y + r j ¯k
1  j .
The above expression implies that the dierence of the individual intertem-
poral elasticity of substitutions plays an important role in indeterminacy of
monetary equilibria. However, the heterogeneneity of the initial share of
capital asset holdings plays no role in the occurrence of indeterminacy if the
individual intertemporal elasticity of substitution is identical over house-
holds.
 CARA Utility In contrast to the first example, the following two ex-
amples are more interesting since wealth distribution has a crucial role in
indeterminacy even if the utility functions are identical across households.
When v j

m jt

=  1=a exp

 am jt

, it can be written as
ˆCARA =
1
1
2
P2
j=1 ln

y + r j ¯k

  ln


   1
 .
In this case, wealth distribution is crucial even if the preferences of
agents are identical. Figure 1 illustrates that indeterminacy tends to arise
in a highly egalitarian economy.
 Quadratic Utility When v j

m jt

=  b=2

m jt   m¯
2
, it can be written
as
ˆQD =
1

 bm¯
P2
j=1
1
y j+r j ¯k
 1
  1
.
This case also derives a result similar to that in the case of CARA utility.
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1
2

1   


O
ˆ
12
Figure 1: CARA and Quadratic Cases
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